Q&A: UK Military action against ISIL in Syria
November 2015
The UK Parliament will be faced with its fourth decision on whether to engage in military action in the Middle East since 2010.
The government proposes that the UK join in military action in Syria against ISIL targets as it has been doing since September 2014 in Iraq.
The motion can be read here.
The ultimate aim of the military operations of the anti-ISIL coalition according to President Obama is to “degrade and ultimately destroy” ISIL. The decision comes in the wake of major international attacks attributed to ISIL in Lebanon, Egypt, France and Mali.
This paper poses questions and assesses the pros and cons of the plan, and the challenges involved.
What is the overall aim behind the military action?
What is the overall goal of the military operations? Nobody should object to wanting to see the end of ISIL, but is this a properly thought out goal? What is required is a political solution to the Syrian political crisis whereby ISIL plays no part, and the regime is transitioned from power. In other words every action should be tested against this goal.
For any military action one has to be clear what defines success. Will military action be to destroy ISIL or as part of a broader political strategy? Being able to define success is essential in identifying the exit point as well. It was concerning from this perspective that the Foreign Secretary stated that the UK would bomb ISIL in Iraq for “as long as it takes to prevail.” Will the exit from military operations be a British decision or one that is taken by the anti-ISIL coalition? Will there be a review of operations to determine if objectives are being achieved? Will Parliament be a part of that process?
Is ISIL the only target or will Al Qaida affiliates be included?
US Secretary of State, John Kerry has stated that Al Qaida affiliated groups, especially Jabha Al Nusra, should be a target. Russia has largely targeted non-ISIS opposition groups. Turkey has also hit Kurdish targets. The UK motion is restricted to just ISIL.
If Al Qaida affiliates such as Jabha Al Nusra are included, then how will targets be determined given that, unlike ISIL, Jabha Al Nusra has no clear area under its control and operates in alliance with many other groups?
What will be the policy towards Jabha Al Nusra? This could be one the biggest obstacles to any successful transition in Syria. Nusra is embedded with many other Syrian opposition forces. They have strong fighting units but ultimately have extreme views. Its leadership is not open to genuine negotiations, though arguably progress could be made to win over many of its foot soldiers.
Will British operations be restricted to ISIL?
How effective might airstrikes be?
In Iraq, the airstrikes against ISIL have been able to support Peshmerga and Iraqi army forces on the ground. Even then many experts have queried how much real progress has been made. ISIL has lost territory, but not many key strategic locations especially along the Euphrates. In Syria, ground forces taking on ISIL are far more limited and weaker. The government has stated that there are 70,000 non-extremist opposition. The Syrian army has rarely engaged with ISIL forces. The “Free Syria’ army is a collective label for what is a large network of different, independent armed forces opposed to the Syrian government. The priority of most of these groups is to fight the regime forces before ISIL.
This has meant that for 15 months the US and other airforces have been restricted to deploying air attacks.
As of October, according to the Pentagon in just over a year of airstrikes the coalition has killed 20,000 ISIL fightersup from 15,000 in July. However, a Pentagon official acknowledged that despite the strikes, given the ISIL recruitment, the number of fighters remains roughly the same between 20-30,000 strong.
Who can provide the ground forces?
Ground forces in Syria are essential if airstrikes are to have a meaningful impact. The Prime minister in his statement on 26 November said that there 70,000 non-extreme Syrian opposition forces. However, these are made up of over 150 different groups of varying quality and many of whom cannot fight in and around Raqqa. Greater efforts will be needed to unite them.
So far the most successful have been the Kurdish groups in both Iraq and Syria. However, Kurdish forces are reluctant to attack outside of their traditional areas. There are some Arab tribes who are fighting with them. Syrian opposition forces have taken on ISIL and were able to kick ISIL out of the province of Idlib in around six weeks. However, they want to know that defeating ISIL does not equate to allowing the Assad regime to survive and avoid the transition as envisioned in the Vienna talks.
Should there be an alliance with the Syrian regime?
Some argue for an alliance with the Syrian regime. However, this would be very divisive within Syria and could mean many would start fighting alongside ISIS given that for Syrians the regime has been easily the largest killer of Syrian civilians in the last four years. It would undermine confidence in the anti-ISIL coalition reinforcing the impression that the US and EU states are only concerned with forces that might threaten their peoples. The Syrian Arab Army has also been shown to be exhausted and demoralised, hence its inability to take much territory even when supported by major Russian airstrikes. It is doubtful the regime is capable of providing major ground forces.
What will Britain contribute that will make the strikes more effective?
Questions need to be asked exactly what British forces will contribute to the effort. Will there be specialist military capabilities that they will provide? The government has claimed that British bombers are considerably more accurate and will save lives. What will really make the difference is improved intelligence from the ground.
Is there a political strategy that military action feeds into?
Military action should feed into a broader political strategy. In the context of bombing ISIL, this should be based on resolving the futures of both Iraq and Syria. Bombing ISIL whilst leaving the two countries in political, economic and military turmoil is like not completing a full course of antibiotics – the infection will return. ISIL and other hard-line Islamist groups have flourished in situations of conflict and disorder where they can offer a degree of order, security and better salaries.
The US does not appear to have a strategy in Syria. For the UK, it cannot be another case of wait for the US to have a policy and then support it.
That said after two rounds of diplomacy in Vienna the roots of a coherent strategy to solve the Syrian conflict are forming. Signs are that the for the first time the key international actors want to end the conflict and are drawing closer in their positions.
1) For the first time Iran has agreed to the terms of the Geneva Communiqué of June 2012. This did not happen in Vienna Round 1. The relevant section is the reference to creating a "transitional governing body would exercise full executive powers.” The final words are vital - full executive powers would mean the removal of meaningful power from the Presidency and the security services.
2) Timetable: There is a timetable in the final document. Firstly, they set the target date of 1 January 2016 for Syrian government and opposition representatives to meet. Secondly they outlined a ceasefire to take place in 6 months and elections in 18 months.
3) Process to agree on who is a terrorist: This has been a divisive issue. Russia and the Syrian regime have adopted a very broad interpretation to include nearly all armed groups opposed to the regime. Others only include ISIL and perhaps, Jabha Al Nusra. Jordan has been tasked with producing an agreed list by the time of the start of the political process. This is the weakest part of the document.
That said, there is no clarity as to the long-term political settlement in Syria. Discussion about transition focuses almost solely on the future of President Assad but less on the future political make up of Syria and how political power will be exercised.
What are the military risks associated with action?
Given the presence of many differing airforces, there is a significant chance of a clash, deliberate or accidental. This risk was shown with Turkey shooting down of the Russian plane in November. The highest risk would be an engagement with Russian forces but hitting Syrian government forces would also escalate tensions.
Another major risk would be the capture of British armed personnel by either the Syrian government or ISIL. Capture by ISIL is a risk now in operations over Iraq.
The killing and injuring of civilians is always a factor. It is essential that future strikes do not lose sight of the vital need to keep these to the minimum. One fear is that the Russian strikes are far less targeted and use less precise weaponry than the United States. This could have negative repercussions on the local population the coalition needs to win over.
Why Iraq but not Syria?
British forces have engaged only in strikes against ISIL in Iraq not Syria (except for the drone strike authorised this summer). Many questioned why and that it was illogical to allow ISIL a safe haven in Syria (although US and other forces were hitting targets there).
One argument was that because the Iraqi government has invited anti-ISIL forces into Iraq there was a clear legal backing for military action. The UK government argues that action in Syria is permissible on the basis of collective self-defence given the attacks on Iraq by ISIL in Syria.
The Syrian government has not invited US and other anti-ISIL forces into Syria. However, the Syrian government has not complained bitterly at the intervention. The Syrian government's media was surprisingly restrained given that the very countries that it had for so long accused of conspiring to destroy Syria (including US, Saudi Arabia) were now bombing Syrian territory. It has not in any way also sought to intervene or disrupt coalition activities.
What if ISIL was defeated in eastern Syria?
If ISIL was defeated in eastern Syria, its forces abandoning major population centres including Raqqa, it raises the issue of exactly who would control these areas and maintain order. Despite the brutality of ISIL, it has maintained a monopoly of the use of force and for those who adhere to its practices a reasonable degree of safety and security. ISIL has adopted a pull-back-to-return-later strategy before, allowing an enemy to take a city, alienate the local population who then welcome back ISIL as it brings security and order.
It is important that the local population is confident that the anti-ISIL coalition has a plan for a post-ISIL phase as this will make it more likely to persuade them to turn on it. The role of local actors must not be underestimated in any attempt to push ISIL out a specific territory.
What are the plans to challenge the ideology and appeal of ISIL?
In the wars against Al Qaida, there were many experts such as Jason Burke of the Guardian, who argue that its "motivations were systematically ignored while the individual agency of its leaders was emphasised. If they were killed the logic went, the problem would disappear." ISIL, even more than Al Qaida, is geared to ensure that it can replace leadership losses.
How serious is the threat of ISIL?
Islamic militancy has posed a threat in various forms since the early 1980s. It evolves and constantly changes. The attacks in Ankara, Sinai, Beirut and Paris, all attributed to ISIL, show that it is now prepared to hit soft targets overseas and has the capabilities to do so.
Would further attacks on ISIL make matters worse? Some argue that by attacking ISIL, many fighters have been spurred on to join it.
Further security measures in Europe must be taken. Sharing of airline data is one option. Greater intelligence sharing is essential.
What options are there for further support to “moderate” opposition?
The United States and Saudi Arabia have announced that they will be increasing their support to the ‘moderate’ Syrian opposition as one of their responses to the increased Russian intervention and the bombing campaign that started on 30 September.
The supply of anti-tank missiles reportedly from Saudi Arabia has certainly had an impact on regime forces. Yet there is consistently the danger that such weapons will fall into the hands of extremist groups including ISIL.
It is doubtful how successful this will be except for keeping these opposition forces viable. The Russian aim appears to be to make such groups and forces completely irrelevant.
What non-military actions can be carried out to contain and restrict ISIL activities?
The obvious answer to this is to solve the conflict in Syria as this is the environment in which groups like ISIL and Al Qaida prosper as is the case in Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia, Libya, Mali and Yemen. Conflict is their host. Without it ISIL will struggle.
Post conflict reconstruction
The Prime Minister announced a pledge of £1b to post-conflict reconstruction. This is a major boost and if a major fund is created would give Syrians some sense of an horizon. It would be useful to learn exactly how these funds would be spent and which bodies might administer them. Have other states committed such funds?
Supply fuel
An LSE research group has proposed to providelegitimate sources of fuel to opposition areas so Syrians not forced to buy diesel from ISIL. International aid is directed to local civil society groups in opposition areas to carry out typically worthwhile projects. Yet incorporated into the costs is energy and the only source of fuel normally is fuel from ISIL.
If fuel was designated an essential item in aid deliveries it could reduce the dependency on ISIL and constrain its income further.
Livelihoods
Having spoken to Syrians in communities across Syria, it is clear that what they want most is an opportunity to get jobs and earn their way. For example, in agricultural areas it does not pay to work the land because there is a shortage of pesticides and fertilisers as well as diesel. Agriculture has always played a significant role in the Syrian economy. By providing livelihoods Syrian communities can keep their young men from running off to join armed groups such as ISIL. The latter is tempting because it offers far higher salaries between $400 to $1000 a month.
Action from Turkey
ISIL has benefitted from Turkey’s unwillingness to even attempt to control its border with Syria. It is able to transport weapons, fighters into Syria and smuggle out oil and artefacts. Turkey is concerned that the weakening of ISIL will lead to a strengthening of the Kurdish groups in Syria, Iraq and Turkey.
Pressure on regional powers
Regional powers could take far more intensive action to prevent foreign fighters leaving to Syria and to prevent individuals donating to ISIL and Al Qaida.
