Caabu briefing with Abubakr Al-Shamahi and Baraa Shiban
On 1 April, two Yemenis discussed the ongoing crisis in Yemen at a Caabu event chaired by Brian Whitaker. Abubakr al-Shamahi, a British-Yemeni journalist and former Caabu intern, and Baraa Shiban, the Yemen Project Coordinator for Reprieve who served as a youth representative in Yemen's National Dialogue explained and analysed the events occurring in Yemen and spoke of their fears for the country’s future.
For a complete write up of the event by Brian Whitaker click here.
Baraa Shiban gave an overview of the events leading to up to the Houthi takeover. Baraa said many people were unsure whether to describe this as a coup or not, but in his view the process that led to the Houthi takeover of Sana’a “began last July when the Houthis – who originated in the far north – seized control of Amran province, adjacent to Sana’a”. Baraa spoke of the Houthis establishing “many prisons in Amran” and ‘changing “Amran's main stadium to become one of the biggest prisons in the country”.
Baraa explained why he thought Yemen’s president Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi did not initially resist the takeover of Amran. Hadi had sought advice from the international community, specifically the United States and the UK. Their advice was not to fight the Houthis because the Yemeni Islah party was strong in that area and fighting the Houthis could result in strengthening Islah. Better, therefore, to let the Houthis and Islahis fight amongst themselves, both weakening each other. However it did not work out like this.
Hadi therefore did not seek to intervene until the Houthis were far closer to Sana’a. Baraa said from 21 September 2014 the Houthis had control of the of the government offices in Sana’a. Despite there still being a president in place, the Houthis “physically took control of the government offices inside the capital and replaced them with their own men.”
Baraa emphasised the takeover of Sana’a was facilitated by the former president, Ali Abdullah Saleh and the forces that were still loyal to him, as they opened up the path for Houthis to come into the capital.
Baraa also spoke about the failure of the transition process at the end of Saleh’s rule. A major problem with the “transition agreement” negotiated by the Gulf Cooperation Council and backed by the United Nations, was that while Saleh stepped down from the presidency, he was granted immunity from prosecution and allowed to stay in Yemen. Baraa affirmed “Basically, you have a war criminal on the loose. Any political transition in the near future without ending the political life of Saleh will just be looking into a future war.”
Further problems with the transition plan include too little focus “on building the capacity of a government that would be able to deliver services to the people.” This meant Yemen had a weak government but at the same time had huge support was being granted for President Hadi by the international community. Added to this, the transitional government paid too little attention to Yemen’s struggling economy. Baraa said “Without providing basic services to the people they don't feel that the political transition is actually touching them and it's only benefiting a group of elites who are in the capital and discussing issues that won't be relevant to them.” Hadi’s disappointing performance and weak government meant he lost much of his support in Yemen.
Baraa emphasised that “even before the bombing started, Yemen was already in deep trouble at the humanitarian level”. He said “the conflict is pushing up prices as food and other commodities become scarcer. The situation before was already bad – 60% of the population were living on $2 a day,” and now that the country is blockaded it can only get worse.
Abubakr al-Shamahi began by looking at Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy towards Yemen. He said “Saudi Arabia considers Yemen to be its backyard. All other countries should go through the Saudis when it comes to things like foreign policy with Yemen.” Abubakr stated he thinks the Saudis have two foreign policy goals when it comes to Yemen. “One is the prevention of the emergence of a Yemeni state that is independent of Saudi Arabia in one way or another.” The second policy goal is “to prevent a foreign power from dominating in Yemen”. He said the Saudis were especially fearful of any foreign influences in Yemen that had “an ideological tilt” which might also affect the kingdom.
In order to achieve these goals “Saudi Arabia has pumped billions into Yemen. It has pumped billions into the Yemeni economy to prop it up and ensure that the Yemeni state doesn't collapse”. Abubakr explained that the “Saudis do not want a collapsed state on their southern border” as this may cause a “potential influx of refugees and other such instability into the country”. At the same time the Saudis “also pumped billions into non-state actors in Yemen – the tribes in particular”. According to Abubakr this meant “the Saudis were simultaneously trying to prop up the Yemeni state and bolstering other – potentially anti-state – forces”, meaning they are a primary reason behind the instability in Yemen.
Abubakr said Saudi funding of the the tribes in Yemen “was based on a misconception that the tribes are a constant in Yemen and will always be more powerful than the state.” He explained “Yemeni history to a degree has shown that the tribes' power can be weakened – it's just that if they are getting billions pumped into them they are going to get their own weapons and they are going to be able to challenge the state's authority.”
Abubakr emphasised that, while Iran does have a role with the Houthis, this role is being exaggerated. The Houthis are a Yemeni group and should be seen as such. “Where the Iranians perhaps have influence with the Houthis is in things like strategy – military strategy perhaps, also PR strategy, media strategy, political strategy”.
Abubakr suggested three potential scenarios for the future, ranging from the most optimistic to the most pessimistic.
The first is a GCC reconstruction of Yemen; “this would require far more money coming into Yemen than previously”. Abubakr concluded this scenario was “pretty far-fetched”. He highlighted that Yemenis need” to understand what the plan is, so they can have hope. A lot of young Yemenis want to leave because they simply have no hope in the future of the country.”
The second scenario outlined by Abubakr would be the emergence of a southern Yemeni state. He said: “South Yemen has a strong secessionist movement that is particularly powerful in terms of its popular legitimacy and support base on the ground.” Hoverer he stated the “southern movement is very, very divided”, and questioned whether a southern state would be capable of tackling the considerable amount of al-Qaeda activity which has occurred in the south.
The third scenario Abubakr identified as both the most “pessimistic” and “realistic”. This scenario was the collapse of Yemen. He argues this could occur because “internal conflict has been turned into an international conflict and Yemen has been turned into a battleground for foreign powers, for Saudi Arabia and whatever message they want sent to Iran.” This is happening, he said, “with no real care for the Yemeni people and for the Yemenis who are stuck in the middle and who want nothing to do with this war.”
Abubakr said sectarian issues in Yemen are “massively over-blown”, adding, “Sectarianism does exist in Yemen and it is growing in Yemen, but it is a bit of a self-fulfilling prophecy. The emergence of sectarianism in Yemen is to do with the current conflict. When you have a group like the Houthis getting into positions of power, and you have this media narrative and this political narrative in the wider region that talks of growing Shia power and things like that, you will then have a counter-response from Sunni areas in Yemen.”
Abubakr finished by talking about what comes next for Yemen? He said “the Saudi Air Force and the Gulf air power cannot defeat the Houthis and Saleh on their own”, as Houthis and Saleh are still advancing in the south “there is going to be a need for ground forces”. The Yemeni military however is now mostly controlled by Saleh, so it is unlikely there will “be a military to fight this fight”. It is also unlikely the tribal forces will step into the vacuum as none of them are “reliable or strong enough to be able to fight the Houthis and Saleh and not be paid off by them as well”. This leaves one other military option; “a ground invasion by the Saudis and the Egyptians or the Pakistanis.” He does not think this is a good idea, as by looking at the history of foreign interventions in Yemen it can be seen that they do not go well.
Abubakr concluded: “Looking at Yemeni history, a lot of the time Yemeni internal conflicts are quite short, or they are protracted but it's not total war. The only time when there are years of conflict is when foreign powers get involved – and that's what we are seeing now.”
“I do hope I'm wrong but I feel a disaster is on the cards.”
