Mustafa Haid, Mary Kaldor, Chris Phillips and Chris Doyle speak at Caabu Parliamentary event on the Syrian conflict and UK policy towards it
On 4 November, Caabu hosted a panel discussion in Parliament on the Syrian conflict and possible effective British policies regarding it: A UK strategy for Syria?
The panellists included the Chairperson of Syrian human rights organisation Dawlaty Foundation, Mustafa Haid, London School of Economics professor and author, Mary Kaldor, Senior Lecturer at Queen Mary, University of London, Chris Phillips, and the director of Caabu (Council for Arab-British Understanding), Chris Doyle. The event was chaired by Conservative MP and Caabu board member David Jones.
Mustafa Haid began by displaying some of the key figures since the start of the Syrian conflict in 2011. Over 4.1m Syrians had fled the country, 7.6m had been displaced internally and 12.2m were in need of humanitarian assistance. He showed that it was the Assad regime that was responsible for the vast majority of casualties, displaying various graphs which pinned the blame on Syrian government forces for well over 90% of the killings on the ground.
In terms of the involvement of international forces in the conflict, he argued that the often proposed call for military involvement was both misleading and unproductive. The major players were already involved militarily in Syria through their various air strikes and arms shipments. He also made it clear that further air strikes would not solve the conflict, arguing that both the regime as well as extremist groups such as ISIS thrive in such zones of conflict. He finished by emphasising that instead of military action, the priority for the UK should be to provide as much civilian protection as possible and to prevent any further bombing, which he hoped would allow greater space for Syrian civil society to emerge.
Professor Mary Kaldor highlighted the fact that ISIS and other armed groups fighting in the Syrian conflict gain far more from the perpetuation of the crisis than from its resolution. She underlined how chaos and a highly criminalised economy enabled extremists to gain both political traction and financially, thriving on their ability to loot, pillage, kidnap, and smuggle.
Kaldor posited that ISIS should be viewed as a symptom and not a cause of Syria’s conflict, due to a lack of a legitimate government and economy, and therefore stressed that the underlying problems from which they gain buoyancy must be addressed seriously. She argued that airstrikes are not the means to this end, describing them as merely a ‘tokenistic response’ to the crisis, which contribute to the escalation of conflict. Similarly, she warned against policymakers pursuing a sectarian agreement; citing Bosnia as a case in point, Kaldor said that in ethnically mixed countries such as Syria, this strategy was a recipe for fighting, could promote ethnic cleansing, and would ultimately end in disaster.
Turning to policies which might realistically ameliorate the conflict, Kaldor made a few suggestions. Firstly, she urged policymakers to support groups and organisations in Syrian civil society trying to promote non-sectarian politics, for they must be the basis for any future legitimate government. Secondly, she advocated a ‘bottom-up approach’, helping local people on the ground who are seeking to end the violence and survive outside of the war economy. For example, backing groups which have negotiated local ceasefires, and ending ISIS’s virtual monopoly on the provision of diesel oil in some areas, thereby restarting agricultural production. Kaldor said talks at the top must of course involve all parties to the conflict, but should first focus on solving the hardships faced by Syrian civilians rather than aiming for long term political solutions immediately. Pragmatic measures on the ground such as protecting local ceasefire initiatives and stopping the bombing and chlorine attacks on civilian populations must be the immediate goals of international diplomatic efforts.
Kaldor concluded her talk by suggesting that a military presence in certain areas might possibly prove constructive, only as a means of ensuring protection for civilian populations. She reiterated her point that policymakers needed to substantially change their outlook on the conflict.
Dr Chris Phillips opened his talk by describing UK policy on Syria for the past four years as ‘confused and reactive’, doing more to ‘fuel the civil war than resolve it’. Phillips argued that the West’s historically limited relationship with and involvement in Syria, as well as the political decision taken in August 2011 that Assad must stand down, had hindered their ability to effectively resolve the crisis. Following bad experiences of intervention in neighbouring Iraq, the US, Phillips explained, has been reluctant to become militarily involved in Syria; and given Syria’s lack of integration into the global economy, sanctions proved an ineffective means of pressuring the Assad government.
Furthermore, the UN Security Council route failed to take off due to the Russian-Syrian alliance, and working with Syrian opposition groups proved difficult due to their many divisions and the lack of any historic ties. Phillips argued that these factors had limited the West’s abilities to affect positive change in Syria, and had in fact worsened the situation, emboldening Assad’s regional opponents to involve themselves in the conflict and preventing peace talks from progressing due to intransigence on the West’s ‘Assad-must-go’ precondition to any discussions.
Assad’s allies, Phillips continued, have shown themselves as more willing to commit to the survival of his regime (and therefore their influence) than his enemies have to defeating him. There was enough support on all sides to keep the conflict going, Phillips remarked, but not enough for any side to win.
Turning his attention to what the UK could and should do, Phillips encouraged three measures in particular. Firstly, he urged the British government to recognise its limited capacity to affect change. Britain had very small leverage when it comes to altering the dynamics of the conflict, and should therefore cease to serve as an echo chamber for US policy positions, and play the role of a policy innovator instead. In parallel to this, he urged the government to continue and expand its work in spotlighting issues which were often ignored in the crisis, such as the rise of sexual violence and the plight of refugees.
Secondly, Phillips encouraged the UK to use its limited leverage to help de-escalate the conflict. Concretely, this meant avoiding military involvement, continuing to partake in peace talks, and abandoning its ‘zero sum call’ that Assad must go. This last measure is the kind of confidence-building step necessary to negotiate ceasefires, Phillips argued.
Thirdly, Phillips underlined the necessity of thinking long-term. Growing instability in Syria’s neighbouring countries must be addressed to help avoid future crises, whilst ensuring Syrian refugee children receive a decent education would be a cost-effective way of preventing future radicalisation.
Chris Doyle began by raising major doubts about the commitment and current approach of the international community. For instance, whereas the 2013 negotiators did not invite Iran to the negotiating table, the current talks in Vienna, occurring over 600 days since the previous conference, did not include the Syrians themselves. Such points he argued show a clear lack of consensus and urgency on the part of the major international players towards Syria, while also displaying a colonial style attitude, with Syrians no longer a part of their own conflict. ‘Our strategy is up in the sky; it is about time to land it on the ground’ he summed up.
Doyle singled out Britain as a country with a particularly limited historical understanding of Syria, referring to our betrayal of the Arabs almost 100 years ago and our lack of engagement with the regime during the pre-uprising period, particularly in comparison to Russia. Such ignorance is highlighted today with Britain’s limited understanding of the situation on the ground. He criticised the kind of media friendly sound bites we often hear in relation to the conflict such as ‘Assad must go’ and it’s ‘either Assad or ISIS’ and instead strongly argued the case for more substantial political solutions which involve the ‘what not the who’.
In terms of more desirable forms of British engagement, he argued that firstly we must make sure to do no further harm, prioritising seeking an end to the conflict (which would in turn help to defeat ISIS) and rejecting those who adopted sectarian language. We should also look for further creative ways to use our leverage, for instance by deploring soft power tools and making more productive use of our aid. He reaffirmed that any such approach must always involve Syrian grassroots movements and make real efforts to put the Syrian people first.
The event ended with some questions from the audience. The panel responded to the first question about the potential effectiveness of the EU as a productive negotiator in the conflict by highlighting the current lack of coherence within Europe itself, with Chris Doyle for instance noting France’s particularly aggressive stance. They agreed that sadly much of Europe, including the UK, still view the Middle East largely through a military lens.
A member of the audience who had recently visited Syria argued that Assad still enjoys significant popularity, and questioned the authenticity of many of the rebel groups. Mary Kaldor responded by making the distinction between the armed rebels and protestors: while the former is often dependent on outside support, the later was more embedded in Syrian civil society, making them more desirable allies.
Lastly Phillip Lee MP and vice-chairman of CMEC (the Conservative Middle East Council) made the point that we must be patient and allow more time for any kind of democratic transition to emerge in Syria, an approach which would involve adopting a more compromising stance towards Assad, given that the age old idea that it is ‘better the devil you know’. Chris Doyle responded and whilst acknowledging the sentiment that such transitions take a while to really succeed, he also emphasised the real urgency of ending the conflict and that in fact authoritarianism and extremism are often inextricably linked.