Background on the Chilcot Inquiry

Background

On 20 March 2003 a coalition of UK and US forces invaded Iraq to overthrow Saddam Hussein and his Ba’athist government over claims that he possessed weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). The initial success of the invasion in fulfilling its goals marked the start of a protracted armed conflict which was largely unsuccessful. Extreme Islamist insurgencies grew, the country’s infrastructure was decimated and no WMDs were found.

This threw the decisions taken by the British and US governments under scrutiny and led to the establishment of several inquiries into the Iraq war. The results of the most recent inquiry, known as the Iraq inquiry or Chilcot inquiry, are due to be published on Wednesday 6 July. The report will be 2.6 million words long.

History

Up until the start of the Iraq Inquiry,called by former Prime Minister Gordon Brown in 2009, there had beenother investigations into events concerning the Iraq War. In 2003, the Commons Foreign Affairs Committee and the joint Parliamentary Intelligence and Security Committee both looked into the intelligence used to justify the war. The Hutton Report, in January 2004, examined the circumstances surrounding the death of scientist and weapons adviser Dr David Kelly. The Butler report, in July 2004, looked once again at the intelligence which was used to justify the war.

The Chilcot Inquiry came after persistent calls to examine the decisions and implications of the UK’s decision to support former US president George W. Bush’s military action in Iraq.

The panel for the Chilcot Inquiryhas Sir John Chilcot as its chair. The other members are Sir Lawrence Freedman, Sir Roderic Lyne and Baroness Usha Prashar. Sir Martin Gilbert,the fifth member of the panel, sadly passed away at the beginning of 2015 following a serious illness.

The remit of the inquiry covers an eight-year period, including the run-up to the conflict and the full period of conflict and reconstruction. Its purpose, according to its website, was to consider “the UK's involvement in Iraq, including the way decisions were made and actions taken, to establish, as accurately as possible, what happened and to identify the lessons that can be learned.”

Proceedings

There have been several series of public hearings from witnesses over the course of the inquiry.  The first round of hearings began on 24 November 2009, and ran until February 2010. The second round began on 29 June to 30 July 2010. The final round started on 18 January and ran until 2 February 2011. In total, 129 witnesses have been called to give evidence, including former PM Tony Blair.

Delays

There were controversial delays to the Inquiry’s proceedings. The Inquiry was initially only meant to last 2 years but has now lasted 7. There were several key reasons for these delays.

One was the sheer extent of material which had to be analysed. The Inquiry covered material of an unprecedented scope over 10 years of public policy and political correspondence (up to 150,000government documents were examined).

Another reason for the delays was the long argumentswhich occurredover what documents could be included, particularly sensitive communications between Tony Blair and George W.Bush. Eventually an agreement was reached in the summer of 2014 whereby the Inquiry was given access to gifts from the correspondence.

The Inquiry also employed a policy of Maxwellisation which delayed the proceedings. This protocolallows those criticised in the report time to prepare a response by giving them advance notice.

Key moments over the course of the hearings

On 26 November 2009, Britain's former ambassador to the US, Sir Christopher Meyer, gave evidence intended to shed light on the private meeting between Tony Blair and George Bush at the then president's Texas ranch in April 2002. The meeting between the two leaders was a controversial one, raising questions about when Tony Blair decided to go to war. Sir Christopher claimed that, although nothing was “signed in blood” at this meeting, Tony Blair’s policy on Iraq and views on regime change were made more concrete.

One of the biggest criticisms of the Iraq campaign concerned the lack of planning for a post-war scenario, which led to the disintegration of the rule of law in Iraq. On 7 December 2009, Major General Tim Cross, who liaised with the US on reconstruction efforts before the invasion, said planning for after the conflict was "woefully thin" and said that he urged Tony Blair to delay the war.

Tony Blair’s own hearing was a key point in the proceedings. He remained firm in conviction that he made the right decision, saying he did not feel “regret for removing Saddam Hussein. I think that he was a monster. I believe he threatened, not just the region, but the world." An analysis of his evidence can be found here.

One of Tony Blair’s most stalwart defenders of Tony Blair was Downing Street’s then ‘spin doctor’, Alistair Campbell. He denied that intelligence had been “sexed up” with regards to WMDs, and said that he defended “every single word" of the 2002 dossier on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction.

Lord Goldsmith QC, the then Attorney-General, who gave advice to the government on the legality of the invasion, had come under much criticism for changing his view on Iraq. Initially, he advised that a further UN resolution should have been requested. However he changed his adviceto say that the intervention could be legally justified just before military action was taken. It is claimed that this change was brought about by political pressure, a claim Lord Goldsmith dismissed as "complete nonsense"

Questions to look out for in the Chilcot report

  1. What role did UN sanctions play in decimating Iraq prior to war and making the conduct of the war and occupation far harder? 
  2. When did Blair decide to go to war, and when did he inform the cabinet of the decision?
  3. Could UN Weapons inspectors have been given more time to complete their mission?
  4. Was the intelligence (on WMDs) manipulated or misrepresented?
  5. Was there a difference between what was said in public and to Parliament on the issue of WMDs and what was being said in private? 
  6. How did the intelligence get it wrong?
  7. How did the assessment that biological and chemical munitions could be with military units and ready for firing with 20-45 minutes” make it into the September 2002 dossier? 
  8. To what extent did the British government have any serious influence on the Bush administration?
  9. Was there too much reliance on Iraqi opposition in exile? 
  10. Were regional powers effectively engaged to garner greater support for the war? Were they listened to?
  11. To what extent did the Prime Minister Tony Blair consult with and listen to British expertise on Iraq? 
  12. To what extent was the British cabinet properly involved in the decision making process 1) On the intelligence 2) on going to war 3) on the post-war planning
  13. Did the Attorney General (Lord Goldsmith) change his legal advice under pressure?
  14. Why did the occupation fail?
  15. Were there enough coalition forces to secure Iraq and mount a successful occupation in the interests of the Iraqi people? 
  16. Were enough fully trained British Arabic speakers assigned to the occupying authorities? 
  17. Did the international community do enough to assist neighbouring states with the refugee crisis?
  18. Were British soldiers under-equipped?
  19. Why were US promises on Israel-Palestine not delivered and did Britain push hard enough for this? 

 

 

Background documents and links

 

Human Rights And Prisoner Abuse